In-cell solventˆre has been treated globally as a typical accident of a reprocessing plant. In order for theˆre to break out, leakage of a signiˆcant amount of solvent, a temperature rise above its ‰ash point, and the presence of ignition source have to occur simultaneously. In this paper, such an accident was analyzed from a probabilistic viewpoint. The occurrence frequency was shown to be 10 -7 /y because a frequency or probability of each event is so small. Nevertheless, we assumed theˆre occurring for 1 h. One hour should be enough for the assessment of the consequence because an operator can implement measures to extinguish theˆre by inducing oxygen deˆciency in the cell, such as closing aˆre damper or stopping the exhausting fan. Since a certain amount of soot produced byˆre does not deteriorate the function of a HEPÂ lter, the eŠective dose for the general public is less than 0.1 mSv. The results will be useful for judging the safety importance level of the safety measures againstˆre.
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